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Stigma model of welfare fraud and non-take-up: Theory and evidence from OECD panel data

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Abstract

This paper tries to challenge two puzzles in the welfare benefit program. The first puzzle is ‘non-take-up welfare’ which means poor people do not take-up welfare. Second, in some developed countries, the benefit level is high, but the recipients ratio is low, in contrast, the others have lower benefit levels but higher the recipients ratio. We present a model of welfare stigma where there coexist both non-take-up and welfare fraud in the equilibrium. It shows the possibility the recipients ratio decreases as the benefit level increases in the comparative statics. Our empirical results are consistent with our theoretical results.

Keywords: Stigma, Take-up, Minimum income guarantee, OECD panel data, Poverty

JEL classification: H31, H53, I38

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1 Introduction

In the developed countries whose economic conditions are not so different, each situation in the welfare benefit program is different. In Japan and Germany, the level of welfare is high, but the recipients ratio, which is the number of welfare recipients divided by total population, is low. In contrast, the United Kingdom and the United States have lower levels of welfare but higher the recipients ratio (Tachibanaki and Urakawa, 2006). This paper attempts to present a theoretical model which can explain this phenomenon and to confirm this relationship in panel data of 25 countries, from 2007 to 2012.

To analyze welfare programs, most public economics researchers exploit a labor supply model that is based on the maximization problem of leisure and consumption goods. This model can explain ‘welfare fraud’ but not ‘non-take-up of welfare’: welfare fraud means households take-up even though they are non-eligible; non-take-up welfare signifies that needy poor people do not take-up welfare even though they are approved to take-up. However, ‘non-take-up’ occurs in most developed countries (Currie, 2006; Immervoll, 2009; Plueger, 2009). Moreover, the result in comparative statics in the standard model cannot explain this relationship between the level of welfare and the recipients ratio since the increase in the level of welfare always increases the incentive of taking-up welfare. Thus, the standard model cannot illustrate two phenomena: non-take-up and the counterintuitive relationship between the welfare level and the recipients ratio in developed countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and Japan.

That is to say; there exist some factors that are not considered in the standard model. One of such factors is welfare stigma. Stigma is a sociological concept describing a negative label applied to behavior by society or a social group (Goffman, 1963). In particular, stigma is an important concept in social psychology (Major et al., 2018). The term welfare stigma refers to the socio-psychological effects and psychological costs associated with taking-up welfare (Besley and Coate, 1992). The mechanism of the occurrence of welfare stigma have been argued mainly in sociological studies (Spicker, 1984). Welfare stigma is thought to arise

from a negative social image of recipients based on the perception that recipients are inferior to non-recipients. Consequently, recipients are treated as socially undesirable compared to non-recipients, then reducing the utility of recipients. This study aims to explain abovementioned two phenomena by analyzing the interdependence between the welfare stigma level and decision making of the workable and non-workable type individuals.

This study extends the model of Besley and Coate (1992) to explain the occurrence of non-take-up of welfare benefits. Unlike Besley and Coate (1992), we endogenize decision-making for needy poor people. The result in our comparative static analysis indicates that an increase in the benefit level can decrease the ratio of welfare recipients to population. To verify the result, this study conducts an empirical analysis using panel data. The results of the empirical analysis are consistent with the theoretical analysis.

Our model considers two types of workable and non-workable. The workable type chooses whether to work or take-up welfare, while the non-workable type chooses whether to take-up or not. If individuals take-up welfare benefit, they suffer from disutility due to social stigma. This stigma cost is endogenously determined, and the higher the conditional probability that a recipient is a fraudulent recipient, the higher the stigma cost. Sensitivities to stigma costs are distributed among workable and non-workable types, respectively. In the workable type, less sensitive individuals take-up welfare and more sensitive individuals choose to work. On the other hand, in the non-workable type, less sensitive individuals choose to take-up welfare, while more sensitive individuals do not take-up it. In the equilibrium, the decision of the workable type, the decision of the non-workable type and the level of stigma cost are determined interdependently.

In our empirical analysis, we use panel data obtained by OECD.stat from 2007 to 2012 for 25 developed countries to examine the relationship between the level of social welfare receipts and the recipients ratio as indicated by the model described above. Regression analysis using five estimation methods that take into account unknown confounding factors shows that the relationship between the level of social welfare receipts and the recipients ratio

shows a statistically significant inverse U-shape. In addition, sensitivity analysis confirms the robustness of this result. Thus, using these OECD panel data, we find that the results of the empirical analysis are consistent with the model described earlier for the period 2007-2012 for these countries.

There are several studies on the welfare stigma conducting theoretical and/or empirical analysis. Moffitt (1983) conducted one of the earlier studies to focus on welfare stigma in economics by analyzing household decision-making regarding whether to take up welfare benefits or supply labor by including the stigma as a kind of monetary cost. Moreover, that paper empirically examined theoretical results using panel study of income dynamics (PSID). Consequently, that author suggested that fixed stigma is statistically significant, but that variable stigma with respect to benefit level is not. Besley and Coate (1992)'s pioneering research analyzed situations wherein stigmas were endogenized. They presented two models of social stigma: statistical discrimination and taxpayer resentment. Their results indicated the occurrence of welfare fraud. As needy types usually chose to take-up welfare benefits, non-take-up of welfare benefits did not manifest in their model. Blumkin et al. (2015) analyzed welfare stigma as a policy tool, which was used to restrain welfare fraud. However, take-up rate in the United Kingdom was approximately 80 % (Duclos, 1995), approximately 60—67 % in the United States (Blank and Ruggles, 1996), approximately 37 % in Germany (Riphahn, 2001) and 16.3—19.7 % in Japan (Tachibanaki and Urakawa, 2006). Thus, non-take-up welfare did not manifest in their model¹.

The contribution of this study is the following; first, we construct a model in which non-take-up and welfare fraud coexist in equilibrium, and show that a comparative statistic analysis reveals the possibility that the recipients ratio decreases as the benefit level increases. Second, in the empirical analysis using the macro panel data, we find that this association is observed and that the benefit level and the recipients ratio show an inverse U-shaped relationship.

¹Hupkau and Maniquet (2018) analyzed the problem of non-take-up of welfare from the perspective of identity economics (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Kranton, 2016)

The structure of this paper is as follows; the next section presents the theoretical model and comparative static analysis. The forth section conducts empirical analysis regarding the relationship the between benefit level and the recipients ratio. The final section concludes this paper.

2 Model

This study develops a model to analyze the interaction between welfare stigma, welfare fraud, and non-take-up. There are two types in the model, the workable type and the non-workable type. The workable type chooses to work or take-up welfare, and the non-workable type chooses to take-up welfare or not. Each individual makes a decision corresponding to the level of stigma cost by taking up welfare. This stigma cost is determined endogenously, and the higher the conditional probability that the recipient is a fraudulent recipient, the higher the stigma cost. The sensitivity to stigma costs is distributed in the workable and non-workable types, respectively; in the workable type, those who are less sensitive take-up welfare and those who are more sensitive choose to work. In the non-workable type, on the other hand, those who are less sensitive choose to take-up welfare, while those who are more sensitive choose not to take-up. In the equilibrium, the decision of the workable type, the decision of the non-workable type and the level of stigma cost are determined interdependently.

In the comparative static analysis, we show the result the possibility that the recipients ratio decreases as the benefit level increases. This result is testified by our empirical analysis using panel data in the next section.

Let us see the basic setting of the model in the next subsection.

2.1 The basic setting

There are two types in the economy, the needy type and the non-needy type. A ‘needy type’ is an individual who cannot work and a ‘non-needy type’ is defined as an individual

who can work if he or she hopes so. We assume that a proportion of needy types in the total population is $\gamma \in (0, 1)$. In the economy, needy types are eligible for welfare benefits, and non-needy types are not. That is, it is called ‘non-take-up welfare’ that the needy type does not take-up welfare benefit and ‘welfare fraud’ that the non-needy type take-up welfare benefit. To make the notation clear, we denote the needy type as ‘type 1’ and the non-needy as ‘type 2’. Type 1 individuals have two choices; take-up welfare or not. The utility setting is,

$$\begin{cases} u(b, z_1) - \phi_1 s(p, q, z_1) & \text{if taking up welfare,} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

where s is an index of stigma cost, which is explained later, p is a proportion of recipients to sub-population in type 1, q is a proportion of recipients to sub-population in type 2 and ϕ is the sensitivity to stigma. $u(\cdot, \cdot)$ denotes a material utility, z_i is type i ’s capability of consumption, $i = 1, 2$. b is a level of welfare benefit. We assume the following properties, $\forall z_i, i = 1, 2$, an income $I = w, b$. For simplicity, we assume the price of consumption good is 1.

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial u(I, z_i)}{\partial I} &> 0, \\ \frac{\partial u(I, z_i)}{\partial z_i} &> 0, \\ \frac{\partial u(I, z_i)}{\partial I \partial z_i} &\geq 0. \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

The third property means that capability and consumption are complementary.

Type 2 individuals have two choices to either accept welfare benefits or work. Type 2’s utility setting is as follows:

$$\begin{cases} u(b, z_2) - \phi_2 s(p, q, z_2) & \text{if taking up welfare,} \\ u(w, z_2) - \theta & \text{if working.} \end{cases} \quad (3)$$

Here θ is disutility of labor, and w is work income. ϕ_i is uniformly distributed from 0 to $\bar{\phi}$ among type i 's sub-population, ϕ_i and ϕ_j are i.i.d, $i, j = 1, 2, i \neq j$. We assume $z_2 > z_1$, that is to say, type 2's capability is higher than that of type 1 individuals who cannot work because of time constraints, physical disabilities or mental illness. These constraints can affect consumption. For example, it makes sense that a single-parent household with limited free time will not enjoy consumption from income I less than a parent's household.

2.2 The critical level of sensitivity to stigma

To understand a household's decision-making, we consider the critical sensitivity of stigma cost, ϕ_i , as follows:

$$u(b, z_1) - \hat{\phi}_1 s(p, q, z_1) = 0, \quad (4)$$

$$u(b, z_2) - \hat{\phi}_2 s(p, q, z_2) = u(w, z_2) - \theta. \quad (5)$$

A type 1 household, where ϕ_1 is less than or equal to $\hat{\phi}_1$ prefers to take-up welfare. Then, all households in which $\phi_1 \in [0, \hat{\phi}_1]$ choose to take-up welfare and all households in which $\phi_1 \in (\hat{\phi}_1, \bar{\phi}]$ do not. Similarly, type 2 households in which ϕ_2 is less than or equal to $\hat{\phi}_2$ prefer to take-up welfare. All households in which $\phi_2 \in [0, \hat{\phi}_2]$ choose to take-up welfare. On the other hand, all households in which $\phi_1 \in (\hat{\phi}_1, \bar{\phi}]$ choose to work.

The proportion of recipients in type 1, p , is as follows:

$$p = \min \left\{ \frac{\hat{\phi}_1}{\bar{\phi}}, 1 \right\} = \min \left\{ \frac{u(b, z_1)}{\bar{\phi} s(p, q, z_1)}, 1 \right\}. \quad (6)$$

While the proportion of recipients in type 2, q , is as follows:

$$q = \min \left\{ \frac{\hat{\phi}_2}{\bar{\phi}}, 1 \right\} = \min \left\{ \frac{u(b, z_2) - u(w, z_2) + \theta}{\bar{\phi} s(p, q, z_2)}, 1 \right\}. \quad (7)$$

In the next subsection, we consider the formulation of the stigma cost and the equilibrium

in the model.

2.3 Formulation of the stigma cost function

In this subsection, we formulate the stigma cost function. The stigma cost is endogenously determined, and the higher the conditional probability that a recipient is a non-needy type, i.e., fraudulent recipient, the higher the stigma cost. The probability that a recipient are non-needy is given by the following:

$$\Pr(i = 2 | \text{Take-up welfare}) = \frac{(1 - \gamma)q}{\gamma p + (1 - \gamma)q} := \Pi. \quad (8)$$

We assume that stigma cost is an increasing function with Π as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} s &= s(\Pi(p, q), z_i), \\ \frac{\partial s(\Pi(p, q), z_i)}{\partial \Pi} &> 0, \text{ for } i = 1, 2. \end{aligned} \quad (9)$$

This formulation is inspired by the statistical stigma in Besley and Coate (1992) and Blumkin et al. (2015). Setting a stigma means as follows. People in society despise ‘welfare fraud’ (the taking-up welfare by non-needy type (type 2)). However, without distinguishing between type 1 and 2, it is difficult to know whether welfare fraud is actually being committed. This stems from the idea that, in the world, it is not reprehensible for a truly needy individual to take-up welfare, but a negative image is formed of an individual who is non-needy individual taking-up welfare, which causes stigma.

Stigma cost is a function of capability. While Besley and Coate (1992) assumed that stigma cost was the same for all recipients, we differentiate stigma cost by the capabilities of type 1 and 2. Even though, we do not assume the sign of $\partial s(\Pi, z_i) / \partial z_i$. We denote π as the ratio p/q , then,

$$\Pi = \frac{1}{\gamma p / (1 - \gamma) q + 1} = \frac{1}{\gamma / (1 - \gamma) \pi + 1}. \quad (10)$$

We can rewrite equation (9) as follows:

$$s = s(\Pi(p, q), z_i) = s(\Pi(p/q, 1), z_i) := s(\pi, z_i). \quad (11)$$

Clearly, we obtain the following:

$$\frac{\partial s(\Pi, z_i)}{\partial \Pi} \frac{\partial \Pi}{\partial \pi} < 0. \quad (12)$$

An equilibrium point corresponds to a solution in the following simultaneous equation:

$$\begin{cases} p = \frac{\hat{u}(b, z_1)}{\phi s(\pi, z_1)}, \\ q = \frac{\hat{u}(b, z_2)}{\phi s(\pi, z_2)}, \\ \pi = \frac{p}{q}. \end{cases} \quad (13)$$

Substituting the first and the second row equations into the right hand side of the third row equation of equation (13), it indicates

$$\begin{aligned} \pi &= \frac{p(\pi)}{q(\pi)} \\ &= \frac{\hat{u}(b, z_1) s(\pi, z_2)}{\hat{u}(b, z_2) s(\pi, z_1)} := M(\pi). \end{aligned} \quad (14)$$

Here,

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{u}(b, z_1) &\equiv u(b, z_1), \\ \hat{u}(b, z_2) &\equiv u(b, z_2) - u(w, z_2) + \theta, \end{aligned} \quad (15)$$

$\hat{u}(b, z_i)$ is the incremental material utility when taking-up welfare. $M(\pi)$ is a mapping from π to itself. By differentiation, we obtain the following:

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{dM(\pi)}{d\pi} &= \frac{\hat{u}(b, z_1)}{\hat{u}(b, z_2)} \left[\frac{\partial s(\pi, z_2) / \partial \pi}{s(\pi, z_1)} - \frac{s(\pi, z_2)}{s(\pi, z_1)^2} \frac{\partial s(\pi, z_1)}{\partial \pi} \right] \\
&= \frac{\hat{u}(b, z_1)}{\hat{u}(b, z_2)} \frac{s(\pi, z_2)}{s(\pi, z_1)} \left[\frac{\partial s(\pi, z_2) / \partial \pi}{s(\pi, z_2)} - \frac{\partial s(\pi, z_1) / \partial \pi}{s(\pi, z_1)} \right] \\
&= \frac{\partial s(\pi, z_2)}{\partial \pi} \frac{\pi}{s(\pi, z_2)} - \frac{\partial s(\pi, z_1)}{\partial \pi} \frac{\pi}{s(\pi, z_1)}.
\end{aligned} \tag{16}$$

Here, we define the elasticity of stigma cost to π :

$$\varepsilon_\pi(z_i) \equiv -\frac{\partial s(\pi, z_i)}{\partial \pi} \frac{\pi}{s(\pi, z_i)}. \tag{17}$$

Using this elasticity, we rewrite this as given:

$$\frac{dM(\pi)}{d\pi} = \varepsilon_\pi(z_1) - \varepsilon_\pi(z_2). \tag{18}$$

Equation (18) corresponds to a slope of $M(\pi)$, which is a change of ratio to itself. Then, if $\varepsilon_\pi(z_1) - \varepsilon_\pi(z_2)$ in some domain, the possibility of multiple equilibria exists. The stability condition is

$$\varepsilon_\pi(z_1) - \varepsilon_\pi(z_2) < 1. \tag{19}$$

We henceforth focus on the equilibrium where the stability condition is kept. The next subsection presents the comparative static analysis focusing on an effect of changes in the benefit level on the recipients ratio in each type and the economy.

2.4 Comparative statics

In this subsection, we conduct comparative statics. We are particularly interested in how a change in benefit level to equilibrium and we compare our empirical evidence and theoretical results.

We define the elasticity as follows:

$$\eta_b(z_i) \equiv \frac{\partial \hat{u}(b, z_i)}{\partial b} \frac{b}{\hat{u}(b, z_i)}. \tag{20}$$

This is an elasticity of material utility to benefit level. The result is summarized in the following proposition.

Proposition 1

$$\operatorname{sgn} \left[\frac{dp^*}{db} \right] = \operatorname{sgn} \left[\frac{\eta_b(z_1)}{\eta_b(z_2)} - \frac{\varepsilon_{\pi^*}(z_1)}{1 + \varepsilon_{\pi^*}(z_2)} \right], \quad (21)$$

$$\operatorname{sgn} \left[\frac{dq^*}{db} \right] = \operatorname{sgn} \left[\frac{\eta_b(z_1)}{\eta_b(z_2)} - \frac{1 + \varepsilon_{\pi^*}(z_1)}{\varepsilon_{\pi^*}(z_2)} \right], \quad (22)$$

$$\operatorname{sgn} \left[\frac{d\pi^*}{db} \right] = \operatorname{sgn} \left[\frac{\eta_b(z_1)}{\eta_b(z_2)} - 1 \right]. \quad (23)$$

Proof. See appendix. ■

When the ratio, $\eta_b(z_1)/\eta_b(z_2)$, is sufficiently low, the equilibrium proportion of recipient in the needy type, p^* , the equilibrium proportion of recipient in the non-needy type, q^* , and the ratio of them, $\pi^* = p^*/q^*$, decrease in the level of welfare benefit.

The implication of the Proposition 2.4 is the following. If the non-needy type's elasticity of material utility to benefit level is sufficiently relatively higher than the needy type's, the impact of increasing in recipients of the non-needy type to stigma, it is the direct effect of an increase in benefit level, is stronger than that of the needy type, then the level of stigma cost raises. If this increase of the stigma cost level is sufficiently large, the indirect effect, disincentive effect to take-up welfare from an increase in stigma, outweighs the direct effect, the incentive effect to take-up welfare from an increase in the benefit level, resulting in fewer beneficiaries.

Let denote R as a proportion of recipients to total population. Since the size of population is normalized to 1, R is given as follows:

$$R = \gamma p + (1 - \gamma)q. \quad (24)$$

An effect of a change in benefit level on R is:

$$\frac{dR^*}{db} = \gamma \frac{dp^*}{db} + (1 - \gamma) \frac{dq^*}{db}. \quad (25)$$

The sign of an effect of a change in benefit level on the recipients ratio is given in the following proposition.

Proposition 2 *The sign of $\frac{dR^*}{db}$ is:*

$$\text{sgn } \frac{dR^*}{db} = \text{sgn } \left[\frac{\eta_b(z_1)}{\eta_b(z_2)} - \frac{1 - \gamma + \varepsilon_{\pi^*}(z_1)}{\gamma + \varepsilon_{\pi^*}(z_2)} \right]. \quad (26)$$

The Proposition 2.4 reveals the possibility that the recipients ratio decreases as the benefit level increases.

The recipients ratio increases in the benefit level when the ratio of elasticity, $\eta_b(z_1)/\eta_b(z_2)$, is sufficiently low, vice versa. The mechanism of the Proposition is similar to the Proposition since the effect of a change in benefit level on the recipients ratio is the total effect of adding the effect on the needy type and the effect on the non-needy type.

In this section, we construct a theoretical model that can account for welfare-fraud and non-take-up simultaneously; the welfare stigma cost varies with the quality of the recipient, and the decision-making of potential recipients depends on the expectation for the level of stigma cost; the stigma cost is assumed to rise with respect to the conditional probability that the recipient is a fraudulent recipient. This stems from the idea that, in this world, it is not condemnable for a true needy person to take-up welfare, but a negative image is formed about a non-needy person take-up welfare, which becomes a source of stigma. In the equilibrium, welfare-fraud and non-take-up occur simultaneously. In the comparative static analysis, we show that an increase in the level of benefits can result in a decrease in the recipients ratio for the workable type and the recipients ratio for the unworkable type. Thus, the recipients ratio of the economy as a whole could also be lower with respect to the level of benefits. In the next section, we empirically test the results of this theoretical analysis using

OECD panel data.

3 Empirical analysis

This section presents empirical evidence to verify the analysis in Section 2 by exploring the relationship between the recipients ratio and the minimum income benefit level using the OECD panel data.

3.1 Econometric model

The panel data were analyzed to investigate the correlation between the minimum guaranteed income level and social benefit recipients. The decision to employ the panel data to investigate the relationship reflects three motivations. First, a panel data model can have better prediction accuracy than the cross-sectional model and time-series model because it has more observations than cross-section data and time-series data. Second, it enables researchers to address the issue of endogeneity caused by omitted variable bias. Third, it allows us to include changes in society in the empirical analysis (Greene, 2012). This paper analyzes the relationship between the minimum income benefit level and social benefit recipients ratio based on the baseline model:

$$y_{it} = \mathbf{x}_{it}'\boldsymbol{\beta} + e_{it}, \quad (27)$$

where y_{it} is the dependent variable, \mathbf{x}_{it}' is the K -dimensional vector of predictors consisting of the target explanatory variable and the covariates, $\boldsymbol{\beta}$ is the K -dimensional vector of unknown parameters, and e_{it} is the disturbance term, which is distributed as $e_{it} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_e^2)$. Furthermore, in equation (27), $i = 1, \dots, n$ indicates the index for a country, whereas $t = 1, \dots, T$ represents the index for time. The OLS estimation of equation (27) after pooling the available data is called the pooling estimation.

When we consider the country-specific heterogeneity in the disturbance term of equation

(27), e_{it} can be decomposed as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} y_{it} &= \mathbf{x}_{it}'\boldsymbol{\beta} + e_{it} \\ e_{it} &= \alpha_i + \nu_{it}, \end{aligned} \tag{28}$$

where α_i is the error depending on the country i and $\nu_{it} \sim \text{i.i.d. } \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_\nu^2)$ is the stochastic disturbance term. Equation (28) can be considered a one-way error component model (Baltagi, 1984) because it decomposes the disturbance term e_{it} into the error based on the individual heterogeneity and the stochastic error. The model in equation (28) can be estimated using a one-way fixed-effect estimator (hereinafter, one-way FE) and the one-way random-effect estimator (hereinafter, one-way RE). The one-way FE presumes the binary dummy variable for α_i whereas the one-way RE assumes that the individual effect is randomly determined.

Considering the heterogeneity caused by the individual effect as in equation (27), the disturbance term can be further decomposed to incorporate heterogeneity in time:

$$\begin{aligned} y_{it} &= \mathbf{x}_{it}'\boldsymbol{\beta} + e_{it} \\ e_{it} &= \alpha_i + \lambda_t + \nu_{it}, \end{aligned} \tag{29}$$

where λ_t is the error depending on the time t . Equation (29), a two-way error component model (Baltagi, 1984), decomposes the disturbance term into the error based on the heterogeneity of country i , the error caused by the time such as economic shocks, and the stochastic disturbance. As with equation (28), the model of equation (29) can be estimated by a two-way fixed-effect estimator (hereinafter, two-way FE) and a two-way random-effect estimator (hereinafter, two-way RE).

This paper estimates the relationship between the minimum income benefit level and social benefit recipients using five estimation methods: pooling, one-way FE, one-way RE, two-way FE, and two-way RE. These estimation methods are assessed via hypothesis testing. We first implement the F -test for pooling versus one-way FE or two-way FE. Second, we

perform the Lagrange multiplier test (hereinafter, *LM*-test) (Honda, 1985) for pooling versus one-way RE or two-way RE. Finally, we conduct a Hausman test (Hausman, 1978) for one-way RE versus one-way FE, two-way RE, and two-way FE. Further information on hypothesis testing in the panel data analysis has been given by Baltagi (2008).

3.2 Data

This section proposes the detail of our dataset used for estimation of the panel data models introduced in Section 3.1. All of the data described below were obtained from OECD.Stat (OECD, 2019).

For the dependent variable, we use the logit-transformed version (`logit_recipients_ratio`) of the recipients ratio (`recipients_ratio`), which is the ratio of social benefit recipients to the total population. Data on the number of social benefit recipients were retrieved from the Social Benefit Recipients Database, and total population data were obtained from Population Statistics.

For the target explanatory variable, we include the minimum guaranteed income `mgincome`, which represents the degree of social benefits in terms of the ratio of the per capita social benefits to the median per capita income. These data can be retrieved from the Adequacy of Guaranteed Minimum Income Benefits. Furthermore, we incorporate the quadratic term `mgincome` (`mgincome_2`) to consider the nonlinear effect of the target explanatory variable.

In order to account for any estimation biases caused by unobserved confounders, we additionally incorporate the following covariates into the vector of predictors:

- `log_gdp_capita`: the natural logarithm of GDP per capita (`gdp_capita`), retrieved from Annual National Accounts. GDP per capita, which reflects the economic situation in each country, are likely to have an immediate impact on the `recipients_ratio`, but there is relatively delayed impact on `mgincome`.
- `youth_dependency`: ratio of young population (0 to 14 years old) to productive population (15 to 64), retrieved from Population Statistics. It reflects the demographic

burden of each country (the ratio of the unproductive population to the productive population). The proportion of younger unproductive population is expected to affect the `recipients_ratio`; it is unlikely to have effect on `mgincome`.

- `old_dependency`: ratio of old population (over 65 years old) to productive population (15 to 64), retrieved from Population Statistics. The proportion of older unproductive population is expected to affect the `recipients_ratio`; it is unlikely to have effect on `mgincome`.
- `divorce_rate`: the marriage divorce rate, retrieved from Family Database. It is a proxy of the household structure, which has impact on the `recipients_ratio` throughout time. The tighter the time constraints, the lower the income.
- `unemployment`: the national unemployment rate for working-age population, retrieved from Labor Force Statistics. It is similar to `log_gdp_capita`, which reflects the economic situation in each country.
- `population_growth`: the population growth, retrieved from Population Statistics and calculated by the authors. It could be a confounding factor that positively affects both `recipients_ratio` and `mgincome`. This is because `recipients_ratio` is calculated as the ratio of recipients to the population, while `mgincome` is likely to be affected by population growth through economic growth (Brueckner and Schwandt, 2015).

The panel dataset using a date on the aforementioned variables. After reducing some missing series in the sample that was not randomly missing, we obtain panel data on $n = 25$ countries covering the time frame 2007 to 2012. This paper conducts the empirical analysis using the panel data with the number of observation $nT = N = 150$.

3.3 Result

This section presents the result of the empirical analysis investigating the relationship between the minimum guaranteed income level on the ratio of the number of recipients.

To begin with, let us simply look at the differences in `mgincome` by country and year. `mgincome`, one of the levels of social welfare, represents the share of social welfare benefits in median disposable income. In order to look at each of those factors that determine `mgincome`, the relationship between the median disposable income and the amount of benefits is shown as Figure 1. The median income for each year in each country was obtained from the Income Distribution Database of OECD.stat, and the social welfare benefits were calculated using the median disposable income as described above. For median social welfare benefits and income, both units are converted to US dollars in each year. This scatterplot simply shows a positive linear relationship between welfare benefits and the median income, and the difference in social welfare systems does not appear to be very large. However, this is a simple correlation and not a partial correlation considering unknown confounding factors, which may be a spurious correlation. This motivates us to carry out more complex analyses.

Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of pooled panel data. This table demonstrates the large inequality between the minimum and maximum recipients ratio (minimum: 0.001, maximum: 0.037). Furthermore, the maximum of `mgincome` in Table 1 indicates that countries tend to guarantee almost 60% of the median per capita income through its social benefit programme, although the median and mean of the guaranteed minimum income is about 40%.

Examining the descriptive statistics by country, Tables 2 and 3 indicate the necessity of adjustment by covariates or dealing with country-based heterogeneity when we assume that the minimum income benefit level is the determinant factor influencing benefit recipients/total population ratio. For example, Canada and the Slovak Republic have the same maximum mean of recipients ratio (0.034); however, their mean minimum guaranteed income level differs (Canada: 0.368, Slovak Republic: 0.238).

Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics by year. Although no large difference in means and medians can be found in this table, the standard deviation of the minimum guaranteed income level has a relatively large outlier in 2012 (0.89). This motivates us to include time-specific heterogeneity into our model by estimating the two-way error component model.

Before proceeding to regression analysis, let us discuss the simple correlation between benefit level and recipients ratio. Figure 2 presents the scatter plot of the observed couples (`mgincome`, `recipients_ratio`). Even though the figure depicts the roughly convex relationship of two variables in interest, possible confounders might lead to a spurious correlation among them. We thus discuss a regression analysis taking into account other factors, which may affect both of these target variables, and unobserved heterogeneity pertaining to country-specific factors and time-specific factors.

As the main findings in this empirical evidence, Table 5 shows the estimation results of panel data regression models based on the data introduced in Section 3.2. Each row corresponds to an explanatory variable, and each column corresponds to an estimation method. The standard errors of the estimated coefficients are estimated using the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent estimator (hereinafter HAC estimator) of Arellano (1987). The bottom part of this table gives the results of the hypothesis testing carried out for model evaluation.

Regarding the hypothesis testing concerning the pooling estimation, both one-way FE and two-way FE are accepted at 1% statistical significance according to the F -test results. LM -tests for the random-effect estimators reject the pooling estimation at 1% significance but accept the one-way RE and two-way RE at the same level of significance. In the comparison of fixed-effect estimators and random-effect estimators, Hausman tests do not reject either one-way RE or two-way RE. Furthermore, neither of the fixed-effect estimators are accepted.

Looking at the estimated coefficients by pooling estimation, `mgincome` has a significantly positive effect on the recipients ratio, and its quadratic term has a significantly negative effect on the recipients ratio. This suggests that the minimum guaranteed income level has an upper convex effect on recipients/population ratio. However, the results of F -test, which compares the pooling estimation with the fixed-effect estimators, and of the LM -test, which compares the pooling estimation with the random-effect estimators, highlight the necessity to take heterogeneity in a country or in both a country and time into account.

The Hausman test results in Table 5 suggest that the correlation between the explanatory variables and country effect or between the explanatory variables and both country effect and time effect is not statistically significant, i.e., the correlation between \mathbf{x}_{it} and α_i or \mathbf{x}_{it} and both α_i and λ_t is not statistically significant. Therefore, the random-effect estimator, which assumes no correlation between the explanatory variables and decomposed effects such as α_i and λ_t , is the most preferable method according to the hypothesis test results. In the estimation result of one-way RE considering country-specific heterogeneity, the minimum guaranteed income level has an upper convex effect on recipients/population ratio as well as the pooling estimation. This relationship is similar to the one found in the estimation of the two-way error component models.

Figure 3 presents the fitted curve of one-way RE with the scatter plot of the couples of observations (`mgincome`, `logit_recipients_ratio`). As we discussed, the one-way RE curve indeed visually indicates the upper convex relationship between the benefit level and the recipients ratio.

The relationship between the level of social welfare and the recipients ratio shown by this empirical analysis, given the background of the theoretical analysis, is that according to Proposition 2.4, an increase in the level of benefits has a direct effect in both needy and non-needy types. The direct effect is that an increase in the level of benefits raises the material utility of taking-up welfare and increases the incentive of taking-up it. On the other hand, indirect effects also occur; this indirect effect shows a negative sign when the rate of increase in non-needy type recipients is greater than the rate of increase in needy type recipients when the benefit level increases, which gives a disincentive effect of taking-up welfare. When the indirect effect is negative and its magnitude is large, the effect dominates the direct effect and the total effect is thus negative. Combining the inverse U-shaped relationship and the theoretical mechanism of the empirical analysis of `mgincome` and `logit_recipients_ratio`, it can be said that when the benefit level is low, the direct effect dominates the indirect effect, or the indirect effect is also positive. On the other hand, when the benefit level is

somewhat higher, the indirect effect is negative, which further dominates the direct effect and the recipients ratio thus decreases.

Figure 4 gives two categories and members defined by an estimated maximum value of recipients ratio. Each member is shown in Tables 6 and 7. ‘group_1’, whose members have less `mgincome` than the threshold, the benefit level corresponding to an estimated maximum of `logit_recipients_ratio` by one-way RE, includes Austria, Canada and Spain. On the other hand, ‘group_2’, whose members have more `mgincome` than the benefit level corresponding to an estimated maximum of `logit_recipients_ratio`, includes Netherlands, Denmark and Germany.

For example, Figure 4 shows that Spain, a ‘group_1’ country, has a low level of social welfare benefits and a low recipients ratio for the period 2007–2012. Moreover, the recipients ratio is the highest for countries with high benefit levels, such as France for the period 2007–2012. Therefore, it can be seen that there is a positive relationship between the benefit level and the recipients ratio in ‘group_1’. On the other hand, the recipients ratio has started to decrease in the situation where the benefit level increased from 2007 to 2012 in Switzerland and Australia, which are ‘group_2’ countries that are above the threshold of `mgincome` defined in our estimated maximum recipients ratio by one-way RE. In addition, if we consider the countries with higher benefit levels than those in Switzerland and Australia, we can see that Germany has a higher benefit level and a much lower recipients ratio from 2007 to 2012. Therefore, it can be seen that the benefit level and recipients ratio are negatively related in ‘group_2’.

To confirm the robustness of the estimated results obtained so far, we perform a sensitivity analysis by excluding covariates. Table 8 shows the results of the one-way RE estimation by adding the covariates one by one. The reason for choosing one-way RE as the estimator here is that it is the most statistically significant as a result of the hypothesis testing for each estimator using the full model described above. As this Table shows, coefficient of `mgincome` is positive in all cases where covariates are lacking, and the squared term of `mgincome` shows

a significant negative coefficient. All of the estimation results in Table 8 show a relationship that is consistent with the results that have been estimated by the full model. The sensitivity analysis therefore strengthens the robust inverse U-shaped relationship between the level of social welfare benefits and the recipients ratio, which has been estimated so far.

In this section, an empirical analysis is conducted to verify the results of the theoretical analysis up to the previous section using OECD panel data for the period 2007–2012. The results of this empirical analysis show that the relationship between the benefit level and the recipients ratio in a given country is shown by an inverse U-shape, and the robustness of this result is further confirmed by a sensitivity analysis. The results of these empirical analyses reinforce the counterintuitive theoretical consequence that, under *ceteris-paribus*, an increase in benefit levels leads to a decrease in the recipients ratio.

4 Conclusion

This study contributed in the following points; first, we constructed the model in which non-take-up and welfare fraud coexist in equilibrium, and showed that a comparative statistic analysis reveals the possibility that the recipients ratio decreases as the benefit level increases. Second, in the empirical analysis using the macro panel data, we find that this association is observed and that the benefit level and the recipients ratio show an inverse U-shaped relationship. The results of this empirical analysis supported the counterintuitive theoretical result that a rise in the benefit level leads to a lower the recipients ratio, when other conditions are held constant.

In this paper, we consider only the discrete decision to participate or not to participate in the labor market. Labor supply decisions after labor market participation are continuous, and both intensive and extensive margin are important in considering welfare benefit programs. Saez (2002) analyzes optimal income transfers in light of both of these. Future work introduces an endogenous stigma into the framework of Saez (2002) to analyze a more

realistic model and presents practical policy implications.

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Appendix

Proof of Proposition 2.4. Equilibrium equations are as follows:

$$\begin{cases} p = \frac{\hat{u}(b, z_1)}{\bar{\phi}s(\pi, z_1)}, \\ q = \frac{\hat{u}(b, z_2)}{\bar{\phi}s(\pi, z_2)}, \\ \pi = \frac{p}{q}. \end{cases}$$

By logarithmic transformation, we obtain the following:

$$\begin{cases} \ln p = \ln \hat{u}(b, z_1) - \ln s(\pi, z_1) - \ln \bar{\phi}, \\ \ln q = \ln \hat{u}(b, z_2) - \ln s(\pi, z_2) - \ln \bar{\phi}, \\ \ln \pi = \ln p - \ln q. \end{cases}$$

By totally differentiating and setting $d\theta = dw = d\bar{\phi} = dz_1 = dz_2 = d\gamma = 0$,

$$\begin{aligned} & \begin{cases} \frac{dp}{p} = \frac{\partial \hat{u}(b, z_1) / \partial b}{\hat{u}(b, z_1)} db - \frac{\partial s(\pi, z_1) / \partial \pi}{s(\pi, z_1)} d\pi, \\ \frac{dq}{q} = \frac{\partial \hat{u}(b, z_2) / \partial b}{\hat{u}(b, z_2)} db - \frac{\partial s(\pi, z_2) / \partial \pi}{s(\pi, z_2)} d\pi, \\ \frac{d\pi}{\pi} = \frac{dp}{p} - \frac{dq}{q}. \end{cases} \\ & \iff \\ & \begin{cases} \frac{dp}{p} = \frac{\partial \hat{u}(b, z_1)}{\partial b} \frac{b}{\hat{u}(b, z_1)} \frac{db}{b} - \frac{\partial s(\pi, z_1)}{\partial \pi} \frac{\pi}{s(\pi, z_1)} \frac{d\pi}{\pi}, \\ \frac{dq}{q} = \frac{\partial \hat{u}(b, z_2)}{\partial b} \frac{b}{\hat{u}(b, z_2)} \frac{db}{b} - \frac{\partial s(\pi, z_2)}{\partial \pi} \frac{\pi}{s(\pi, z_2)} \frac{d\pi}{\pi}, \\ \frac{d\pi}{\pi} = \frac{dp}{p} - \frac{dq}{q}. \end{cases} \\ & \iff \\ & \begin{cases} \frac{dp}{p} = \eta_b(z_1) \frac{db}{b} + \varepsilon_\pi(z_1) \frac{d\pi}{\pi}, \\ \frac{dq}{q} = \eta_b(z_2) \frac{db}{b} + \varepsilon_\pi(z_2) \frac{d\pi}{\pi}, \\ \frac{d\pi}{\pi} = \frac{dp}{p} - \frac{dq}{q}. \end{cases} \end{aligned}$$

A matrix representation is given below:

$$\begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & -\varepsilon_{\pi}(z_1) \\ 0 & 1 & -\varepsilon_{\pi}(z_2) \\ 1 & -1 & -1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \frac{dp/p}{db/b} \\ \frac{dq/q}{db/b} \\ \frac{d\pi/\pi}{db/b} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \eta_b(z_1) \\ \eta_b(z_2) \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}.$$

By Cramer's rule, solutions are given as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{dp/p}{db/b} &= \frac{-\eta_b(z_1)[1 + \varepsilon_{\pi}(z_2)] + \eta_b(z_2)\varepsilon_{\pi}(z_1)}{\varepsilon_{\pi}(z_1) - [1 + \varepsilon_{\pi}(z_2)]}, \\ \frac{dq/q}{db/b} &= \frac{\eta_b(z_2)[1 + \varepsilon_{\pi}(z_1)] - \eta_b(z_1)\varepsilon_{\pi}(z_2)}{\varepsilon_{\pi}(z_1) - [1 + \varepsilon_{\pi}(z_2)]}, \\ \frac{d\pi/\pi}{db/b} &= \frac{-\eta_b(z_1) + \eta_b(z_2)}{\varepsilon_{\pi}(z_1) - [1 + \varepsilon_{\pi}(z_2)]}. \end{aligned}$$

Since the stability condition is $\varepsilon_{\pi^*}(z_1) - \varepsilon_{\pi^*}(z_2) < 1$, the denominator, $\varepsilon_{\pi}(z_1) - [1 + \varepsilon_{\pi}(z_2)]$, is negative.

Therefore, the result of comparative statics regarding a change in benefit level is given as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{sgn} \left[\frac{dp^*}{db} \right] &= \text{sgn} \left[\frac{\eta_b(z_1)}{\eta_b(z_2)} - \frac{\varepsilon_{\pi^*}(z_1)}{1 + \varepsilon_{\pi^*}(z_2)} \right], \\ \text{sgn} \left[\frac{dq^*}{db} \right] &= \text{sgn} \left[\frac{\eta_b(z_1)}{\eta_b(z_2)} - \frac{1 + \varepsilon_{\pi^*}(z_1)}{\varepsilon_{\pi^*}(z_2)} \right], \\ \text{sgn} \left[\frac{d\pi^*}{db} \right] &= \text{sgn} \left[\frac{\eta_b(z_1)}{\eta_b(z_2)} - 1 \right]. \end{aligned}$$

■




Figure 1: Relationship between the median income and benefit level

Notes: Strings accompanied by points indicate ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 code of countries. All numerical units are converted to US dollars for the corresponding year.




Figure 2: Simple relationship between the recipients ratio and benefit level
Notes: Strings accompanied by points indicate ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 code of countries with the last two digits of the year.




Figure 3: Fitted curve of one-way RE and scatter plot between the recipients ratio and benefit level

Notes: Strings accompanied by points indicate ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 code of countries with the last two digits of the year. The dashed blue line indicates a location of **mgincome** which corresponds to an estimated maximum of **recipients_ratio_logit** obtained by the fitted curve of one-way RE. ‘group_1’ and ‘group_2’ are defined by the location based on the dashed blue line. If an observed value of **mgincome** is less than the dashed blue line, it is categorized as ‘group_1’ otherwise it is categorized as ‘group_2’.




Figure 4: Scatter plot between the recipients ratio and benefit level, grouped

Notes: Strings accompanied by points indicate ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 code of countries with the last two digits of the year. The dashed blue line indicates a location of `mgincome` which corresponds to an estimated maximum of `recipients_ratio_logit` obtained by the fitted curve of one-way RE. ‘group_1’ and ‘group_2’ are defined by the location based on the dashed blue line. If an observed value of `mgincome` is less than the dashed blue line, it is categorized as ‘group_1’ otherwise it is categorized as ‘group_2’.

Table 1: Descriptive statistics of OECD panel data: whole data

| | Mean | Median | Standard Deviation | Min | Max |
|------------------------|-----------|-----------|--------------------|-----------|-----------|
| recipients_ratio | 0.016 | 0.015 | 0.009 | 0.001 | 0.037 |
| logit_recipients_ratio | -4.327 | -4.175 | 0.753 | -6.591 | -3.268 |
| mgincome | 0.397 | 0.400 | 0.082 | 0.230 | 0.590 |
| mgincome_2 | 0.164 | 0.160 | 0.065 | 0.053 | 0.348 |
| gdp_capita | 37704.939 | 37699.559 | 14081.170 | 16788.433 | 91814.013 |
| log_gdp_capita | 10.479 | 10.537 | 0.335 | 9.728 | 11.428 |
| youth_dependency | 0.254 | 0.241 | 0.053 | 0.199 | 0.459 |
| old_dependency | 0.229 | 0.238 | 0.040 | 0.138 | 0.314 |
| divorce_rate | 0.002 | 0.002 | 0.000 | 0.001 | 0.003 |
| unemployment | 0.074 | 0.072 | 0.037 | 0.023 | 0.249 |
| population_growth | 0.006 | 0.005 | 0.007 | -0.009 | 0.025 |

Notes: $T = 6, n = 25, N = 150$.

Table 2: Descriptive stastistics of OECD panel data: by country (1)

| country | recipients_ratio | logit_recipients_ratio | mgincome | mgincome_2 | gdp_capita | log_gdp_capita |
|---------------------------|------------------|------------------------|---------------|---------------|----------------------|----------------|
| Mean (Standard Deviation) | | | | | | |
| Australia | 0.013 (0.001) | -4.315 (0.074) | 0.447 (0.010) | 0.200 (0.009) | 40852.112 (2156.481) | 10.617 (0.053) |
| Austria | 0.018 (0.002) | -4.029 (0.138) | 0.430 (0.039) | 0.186 (0.035) | 42435.028 (2584.710) | 10.654 (0.060) |
| Belgium | 0.009 (0.000) | -4.744 (0.035) | 0.437 (0.012) | 0.191 (0.011) | 39517.464 (2220.265) | 10.583 (0.056) |
| Canada | 0.034 (0.002) | -3.335 (0.049) | 0.368 (0.017) | 0.136 (0.013) | 40428.026 (1271.527) | 10.607 (0.031) |
| Czech Republic | 0.013 (0.006) | -4.592 (0.996) | 0.315 (0.032) | 0.100 (0.022) | 27776.316 (1070.706) | 10.231 (0.039) |
| Denmark | 0.015 (0.002) | -4.161 (0.140) | 0.575 (0.010) | 0.331 (0.012) | 42137.252 (2322.734) | 10.647 (0.055) |
| Estonia | 0.007 (0.003) | -4.984 (0.433) | 0.273 (0.033) | 0.076 (0.018) | 22846.807 (2032.578) | 10.033 (0.088) |
| Finland | 0.021 (0.001) | -3.837 (0.056) | 0.462 (0.010) | 0.213 (0.009) | 39257.144 (1350.605) | 10.577 (0.034) |
| France | 0.019 (0.002) | -3.929 (0.094) | 0.382 (0.004) | 0.146 (0.003) | 35822.205 (1475.914) | 10.486 (0.041) |
| Germany | 0.004 (0.000) | -5.525 (0.044) | 0.515 (0.008) | 0.265 (0.009) | 39925.940 (2678.832) | 10.593 (0.066) |
| Hungary | 0.023 (0.003) | -3.747 (0.142) | 0.365 (0.059) | 0.136 (0.044) | 21298.496 (1512.043) | 9.964 (0.072) |
| Iceland | 0.009 (0.001) | -4.710 (0.076) | 0.405 (0.038) | 0.165 (0.031) | 41380.192 (1215.725) | 10.630 (0.029) |
| Israel | 0.011 (0.001) | -4.547 (0.090) | 0.457 (0.008) | 0.209 (0.007) | 28872.669 (1899.220) | 10.269 (0.065) |
| Korea | 0.031 (0.002) | -3.456 (0.055) | 0.353 (0.014) | 0.125 (0.010) | 29748.950 (1733.041) | 10.299 (0.058) |
| Luxembourg | 0.017 (0.001) | -4.050 (0.077) | 0.428 (0.020) | 0.184 (0.017) | 86918.694 (3971.080) | 11.372 (0.045) |
| Netherlands | 0.020 (0.001) | -3.902 (0.076) | 0.510 (0.015) | 0.260 (0.015) | 45641.618 (1321.341) | 10.728 (0.029) |
| New Zealand | 0.002 (0.000) | -6.368 (0.100) | 0.418 (0.004) | 0.175 (0.003) | 30845.995 (1511.117) | 10.336 (0.049) |
| Norway | 0.010 (0.001) | -4.610 (0.054) | 0.400 (0.006) | 0.160 (0.005) | 59776.358 (3956.631) | 10.997 (0.066) |
| Poland | 0.012 (0.001) | -4.378 (0.081) | 0.325 (0.036) | 0.107 (0.025) | 20207.247 (2579.601) | 9.907 (0.129) |
| Portugal | 0.012 (0.002) | -4.419 (0.128) | 0.332 (0.026) | 0.111 (0.017) | 26558.193 (521.970) | 10.187 (0.020) |
| Slovak Republic | 0.034 (0.002) | -3.360 (0.076) | 0.238 (0.008) | 0.057 (0.004) | 24142.536 (2038.476) | 10.089 (0.086) |
| Slovenia | 0.022 (0.002) | -3.818 (0.092) | 0.418 (0.008) | 0.175 (0.006) | 28351.080 (880.111) | 10.252 (0.031) |
| Spain | 0.004 (0.001) | -5.658 (0.320) | 0.248 (0.013) | 0.062 (0.007) | 32403.199 (568.189) | 10.386 (0.017) |
| Sweden | 0.024 (0.001) | -3.686 (0.055) | 0.387 (0.010) | 0.150 (0.008) | 42080.770 (1911.048) | 10.646 (0.045) |
| Switzerland | 0.018 (0.001) | -4.013 (0.055) | 0.433 (0.015) | 0.188 (0.013) | 53399.177 (3100.762) | 10.884 (0.058) |

Notes: $T = 6, n = 25, N = 150$ Numbers in parentheses stand for the standard deviation.

Table 3: Descriptive statistics of OECD panel data: by country (2)

| | country | youth_dependency | old_dependency | divorce_rate | unemployment | population_growth |
|---------------------------|-----------------|------------------|----------------|---------------|---------------|-------------------|
| Mean (Standard Deviation) | | | | | | |
| | Australia | 0.284 (0.002) | 0.201 (0.007) | 0.002 (0.000) | 0.050 (0.005) | 0.017 (0.003) |
| | Austria | 0.222 (0.006) | 0.259 (0.005) | 0.002 (0.000) | 0.048 (0.004) | 0.003 (0.001) |
| | Belgium | 0.257 (0.001) | 0.261 (0.003) | 0.003 (0.000) | 0.076 (0.005) | 0.009 (0.002) |
| | Canada | 0.239 (0.004) | 0.203 (0.008) | 0.002 (0.000) | 0.073 (0.010) | 0.011 (0.001) |
| | Czech Republic | 0.205 (0.006) | 0.218 (0.014) | 0.003 (0.000) | 0.063 (0.011) | 0.004 (0.004) |
| | Denmark | 0.276 (0.004) | 0.251 (0.014) | 0.003 (0.000) | 0.061 (0.020) | 0.005 (0.001) |
| | Estonia | 0.226 (0.006) | 0.259 (0.005) | 0.002 (0.000) | 0.107 (0.048) | -0.002 (0.001) |
| | Finland | 0.252 (0.002) | 0.261 (0.014) | 0.002 (0.000) | 0.076 (0.008) | 0.005 (0.000) |
| | France | 0.284 (0.003) | 0.261 (0.007) | 0.002 (0.000) | 0.085 (0.009) | 0.005 (0.000) |
| | Germany | 0.205 (0.002) | 0.310 (0.005) | 0.002 (0.000) | 0.071 (0.012) | -0.004 (0.003) |
| | Hungary | 0.215 (0.003) | 0.241 (0.006) | 0.002 (0.000) | 0.098 (0.017) | -0.003 (0.001) |
| | Iceland | 0.311 (0.003) | 0.179 (0.008) | 0.002 (0.000) | 0.056 (0.024) | 0.008 (0.013) |
| | Israel | 0.454 (0.005) | 0.160 (0.004) | 0.002 (0.000) | 0.083 (0.011) | 0.019 (0.002) |
| | Korea | 0.227 (0.016) | 0.149 (0.009) | 0.002 (0.000) | 0.035 (0.002) | 0.006 (0.001) |
| | Luxembourg | 0.259 (0.008) | 0.204 (0.002) | 0.002 (0.000) | 0.048 (0.005) | 0.019 (0.003) |
| | Netherlands | 0.263 (0.003) | 0.230 (0.012) | 0.002 (0.000) | 0.041 (0.008) | 0.004 (0.001) |
| | New Zealand | 0.316 (0.001) | 0.195 (0.008) | 0.002 (0.000) | 0.058 (0.014) | 0.009 (0.002) |
| | Norway | 0.285 (0.004) | 0.226 (0.006) | 0.002 (0.000) | 0.031 (0.004) | 0.012 (0.001) |
| | Poland | 0.215 (0.003) | 0.191 (0.003) | 0.002 (0.000) | 0.092 (0.012) | 0.002 (0.004) |
| | Portugal | 0.230 (0.004) | 0.277 (0.010) | 0.002 (0.000) | 0.113 (0.032) | -0.000 (0.002) |
| | Slovak Republic | 0.217 (0.004) | 0.173 (0.005) | 0.002 (0.000) | 0.125 (0.019) | 0.001 (0.000) |
| | Slovenia | 0.203 (0.004) | 0.238 (0.006) | 0.001 (0.000) | 0.067 (0.018) | 0.004 (0.003) |
| | Spain | 0.218 (0.005) | 0.247 (0.008) | 0.002 (0.000) | 0.173 (0.063) | 0.009 (0.007) |
| | Sweden | 0.257 (0.003) | 0.279 (0.012) | 0.002 (0.000) | 0.076 (0.011) | 0.008 (0.001) |
| | Switzerland | 0.220 (0.007) | 0.252 (0.011) | 0.002 (0.000) | 0.042 (0.006) | 0.009 (0.005) |

Notes: $T = 6$, $n = 25$, $N = 150$ Numbers in parentheses stand for the standard deviation.

Table 4: Descriptive statistics of OECD panel data: by year

| year | recipients_ratio | logit_recipients_ratio | mgincome | mgincome_2 | gdp_capita | log_gdp_capita | youth_dependency | old_dependency | divorce_rate | unemployment | population_growth |
|--------------------|------------------|------------------------|----------|------------|------------|----------------|------------------|----------------|--------------|--------------|-------------------|
| Mean | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2007 | 0.016 | -4.339 | 0.396 | 0.164 | 35645.300 | 10.419 | 0.257 | 0.221 | 0.002 | 0.060 | 0.007 |
| 2008 | 0.015 | -4.383 | 0.391 | 0.160 | 37381.672 | 10.468 | 0.255 | 0.223 | 0.002 | 0.057 | 0.008 |
| 2009 | 0.016 | -4.311 | 0.397 | 0.164 | 36290.570 | 10.443 | 0.253 | 0.226 | 0.002 | 0.078 | 0.007 |
| 2010 | 0.017 | -4.275 | 0.400 | 0.166 | 37469.973 | 10.476 | 0.252 | 0.230 | 0.002 | 0.084 | 0.006 |
| 2011 | 0.016 | -4.370 | 0.399 | 0.166 | 39355.518 | 10.524 | 0.252 | 0.234 | 0.002 | 0.081 | 0.005 |
| 2012 | 0.016 | -4.284 | 0.398 | 0.166 | 40086.599 | 10.543 | 0.252 | 0.240 | 0.002 | 0.083 | 0.005 |
| Median | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2007 | 0.016 | -4.147 | 0.400 | 0.160 | 36871.534 | 10.515 | 0.249 | 0.229 | 0.002 | 0.054 | 0.005 |
| 2008 | 0.014 | -4.231 | 0.400 | 0.160 | 38133.413 | 10.549 | 0.242 | 0.234 | 0.002 | 0.056 | 0.007 |
| 2009 | 0.015 | -4.212 | 0.400 | 0.160 | 37695.802 | 10.537 | 0.240 | 0.237 | 0.002 | 0.078 | 0.005 |
| 2010 | 0.015 | -4.156 | 0.400 | 0.160 | 38737.069 | 10.565 | 0.237 | 0.239 | 0.002 | 0.077 | 0.005 |
| 2011 | 0.015 | -4.194 | 0.420 | 0.176 | 40683.337 | 10.614 | 0.236 | 0.240 | 0.002 | 0.072 | 0.004 |
| 2012 | 0.016 | -4.127 | 0.420 | 0.176 | 40619.937 | 10.612 | 0.236 | 0.248 | 0.002 | 0.074 | 0.004 |
| Standard Deviation | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2007 | 0.009 | 0.775 | 0.082 | 0.064 | 13813.492 | 0.353 | 0.054 | 0.039 | 0.000 | 0.024 | 0.007 |
| 2008 | 0.008 | 0.758 | 0.084 | 0.064 | 14436.887 | 0.348 | 0.054 | 0.040 | 0.000 | 0.022 | 0.007 |
| 2009 | 0.009 | 0.731 | 0.082 | 0.065 | 13382.286 | 0.336 | 0.053 | 0.041 | 0.000 | 0.033 | 0.007 |
| 2010 | 0.009 | 0.728 | 0.080 | 0.065 | 13804.461 | 0.330 | 0.053 | 0.041 | 0.000 | 0.040 | 0.006 |
| 2011 | 0.010 | 0.865 | 0.084 | 0.068 | 14869.727 | 0.330 | 0.053 | 0.041 | 0.000 | 0.040 | 0.007 |
| 2012 | 0.009 | 0.726 | 0.089 | 0.071 | 15019.149 | 0.329 | 0.054 | 0.042 | 0.000 | 0.046 | 0.007 |

Notes: $T = 6, n = 25, N = 150$.

Table 5: Results of empirical analysis using OECD panel data

| | Dependent variable: | | | | |
|----------------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| | logit_recipients_ratio | | | | |
| | Pooling | one-way FE | two-way FE | one-way RE | two-way RE |
| mgincome | 15.434** (6.382) | 18.021*** (6.737) | 19.430*** (7.076) | 17.534*** (6.704) | 19.006*** (6.843) |
| mgincome_2 | -16.573** (7.593) | -21.915*** (7.800) | -23.710*** (8.399) | -21.050** (8.198) | -22.761*** (8.512) |
| log_gdp_capita | 0.252 (0.264) | 0.492 (0.394) | 0.332 (0.570) | 0.423 (0.261) | 0.352 (0.295) |
| unemployment | 2.736 (2.387) | 5.417*** (1.654) | 5.842*** (2.019) | 5.250*** (1.375) | 5.602*** (1.775) |
| youth_dependency | -6.370*** (1.624) | -4.024 (7.033) | -5.626 (7.782) | -5.208 (3.685) | -6.160 (4.189) |
| old_dependency | -8.012*** (2.192) | -4.283 (5.286) | -8.213 (8.324) | -5.069 (3.977) | -7.638 (5.348) |
| divorce_rate | 81.888 (172.752) | 244.345 (210.052) | 281.102 (216.581) | 204.770 (186.280) | 255.144 (191.322) |
| population_growth | -4.079 (13.483) | 12.090* (7.213) | 12.621* (7.048) | 10.512 (8.717) | 11.681 (8.643) |
| Constant | -7.279** (2.932) | | | -10.693*** (3.323) | -9.555*** (3.354) |
| R^2 | 0.163 | 0.233 | 0.246 | 0.214 | 0.251 |
| Adjusted R^2 | 0.116 | 0.023 | -0.003 | 0.170 | 0.179 |
| F -test (vs. pooling) | | 57.200 *** | 47.991*** | | |
| F -test (vs. one-way FE) | | | 1.219 | | |
| LM -test (vs. pooling) | | | | 17.294*** | 11.119*** |
| Hausman-test (vs. random effect) | | 1.424 | 0.950 | | |

Notes: Numbers in parentheses stand for standard error calculated by HAC (Arellano, 1987) estimator. Above *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively.

Table 6: ‘group_1’ countries less than an estimated maximum of `recipients_ratio_logit` by one-way RE

| group_1 | | | | | |
|----------------|------|-----------|-----------------|------|-----------|
| country | year | name_year | country | year | name_year |
| Austria | 2008 | AT08 | Luxembourg | 2007 | LU07 |
| Austria | 2009 | AT09 | New Zealand | 2008 | NZ08 |
| Austria | 2010 | AT10 | Norway | 2007 | NO07 |
| Canada | 2007 | CA07 | Norway | 2008 | NO08 |
| Canada | 2008 | CA08 | Norway | 2009 | NO09 |
| Canada | 2009 | CA09 | Norway | 2010 | NO10 |
| Canada | 2010 | CA10 | Norway | 2011 | NO11 |
| Canada | 2011 | CA11 | Norway | 2012 | NO12 |
| Canada | 2012 | CA12 | Poland | 2007 | PL07 |
| Czech Republic | 2007 | CZ07 | Poland | 2008 | PL08 |
| Czech Republic | 2008 | CZ08 | Poland | 2009 | PL09 |
| Czech Republic | 2009 | CZ09 | Poland | 2010 | PL10 |
| Czech Republic | 2010 | CZ10 | Poland | 2011 | PL11 |
| Czech Republic | 2011 | CZ11 | Poland | 2012 | PL12 |
| Czech Republic | 2012 | CZ12 | Portugal | 2007 | PT07 |
| Estonia | 2007 | EE07 | Portugal | 2008 | PT08 |
| Estonia | 2008 | EE08 | Portugal | 2009 | PT09 |
| Estonia | 2009 | EE09 | Portugal | 2010 | PT10 |
| Estonia | 2010 | EE10 | Portugal | 2011 | PT11 |
| Estonia | 2011 | EE11 | Portugal | 2012 | PT12 |
| Estonia | 2012 | EE12 | Slovak Republic | 2007 | SK07 |
| France | 2007 | FR07 | Slovak Republic | 2008 | SK08 |
| France | 2008 | FR08 | Slovak Republic | 2009 | SK09 |
| France | 2009 | FR09 | Slovak Republic | 2010 | SK10 |
| France | 2010 | FR10 | Slovak Republic | 2011 | SK11 |
| France | 2011 | FR11 | Slovak Republic | 2012 | SK12 |
| France | 2012 | FR12 | Slovenia | 2007 | SI07 |
| Hungary | 2009 | HU09 | Slovenia | 2008 | SI08 |
| Hungary | 2010 | HU10 | Spain | 2007 | ES07 |
| Hungary | 2011 | HU11 | Spain | 2008 | ES08 |
| Hungary | 2012 | HU12 | Spain | 2009 | ES09 |
| Iceland | 2007 | IS07 | Spain | 2010 | ES10 |
| Iceland | 2008 | IS08 | Spain | 2011 | ES11 |
| Iceland | 2009 | IS09 | Spain | 2012 | ES12 |
| Korea | 2007 | KR07 | Sweden | 2007 | SE07 |
| Korea | 2008 | KR08 | Sweden | 2008 | SE08 |
| Korea | 2009 | KR09 | Sweden | 2009 | SE09 |
| Korea | 2010 | KR10 | Sweden | 2010 | SE10 |
| Korea | 2011 | KR11 | Sweden | 2011 | SE11 |
| Korea | 2012 | KR12 | Sweden | 2012 | SE12 |

Notes: ‘group_1’ defined by countries with the value of `recipients_ratio_logit` which is less than an estimated maximum of `recipients_ratio_logit` by one-way RE. Column ‘name_year’ indicates ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 code of countries with the last two digits of the year.

Table 7: ‘group_2’ countries less than an estimated maximum of `recipients_ratio_logit` by one-way RE

| group_2 | | | | | |
|-----------|------|-----------|-------------|------|-----------|
| country | year | name_year | country | year | name_year |
| Australia | 2007 | AU07 | Israel | 2009 | IL09 |
| Australia | 2008 | AU08 | Israel | 2010 | IL10 |
| Australia | 2009 | AU09 | Israel | 2011 | IL11 |
| Australia | 2010 | AU10 | Israel | 2012 | IL12 |
| Australia | 2011 | AU11 | Luxembourg | 2008 | LU08 |
| Australia | 2012 | AU12 | Luxembourg | 2009 | LU09 |
| Austria | 2007 | AT07 | Luxembourg | 2010 | LU10 |
| Austria | 2011 | AT11 | Luxembourg | 2011 | LU11 |
| Austria | 2012 | AT12 | Luxembourg | 2012 | LU12 |
| Belgium | 2007 | BE07 | Netherlands | 2007 | NL07 |
| Belgium | 2008 | BE08 | Netherlands | 2008 | NL08 |
| Belgium | 2009 | BE09 | Netherlands | 2009 | NL09 |
| Belgium | 2010 | BE10 | Netherlands | 2010 | NL10 |
| Belgium | 2011 | BE11 | Netherlands | 2011 | NL11 |
| Belgium | 2012 | BE12 | Netherlands | 2012 | NL12 |
| Denmark | 2007 | DK07 | New Zealand | 2007 | NZ07 |
| Denmark | 2008 | DK08 | New Zealand | 2009 | NZ09 |
| Denmark | 2009 | DK09 | New Zealand | 2010 | NZ10 |
| Denmark | 2010 | DK10 | New Zealand | 2011 | NZ11 |
| Denmark | 2011 | DK11 | New Zealand | 2012 | NZ12 |
| Denmark | 2012 | DK12 | Slovenia | 2009 | SI09 |
| Finland | 2007 | FI07 | Slovenia | 2010 | SI10 |
| Finland | 2008 | FI08 | Slovenia | 2011 | SI11 |
| Finland | 2009 | FI09 | Slovenia | 2012 | SI12 |
| Finland | 2010 | FI10 | Switzerland | 2007 | CH07 |
| Finland | 2011 | FI11 | Switzerland | 2008 | CH08 |
| Finland | 2012 | FI12 | Switzerland | 2009 | CH09 |
| Germany | 2007 | DE07 | Switzerland | 2010 | CH10 |
| Germany | 2008 | DE08 | Switzerland | 2011 | CH11 |
| Germany | 2009 | DE09 | Switzerland | 2012 | CH12 |
| Germany | 2010 | DE10 | | | |
| Germany | 2011 | DE11 | | | |
| Germany | 2012 | DE12 | | | |
| Hungary | 2007 | HU07 | | | |
| Hungary | 2008 | HU08 | | | |
| Iceland | 2010 | IS10 | | | |
| Iceland | 2011 | IS11 | | | |
| Iceland | 2012 | IS12 | | | |
| Israel | 2007 | IL07 | | | |
| Israel | 2008 | IL08 | | | |

Notes: ‘group_2’ defined by countries with the value of `recipients_ratio_logit` which is more than an estimated maximum of `recipients_ratio_logit` by one-way RE. Column ‘name_year’ indicate ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 code of countries with the last two digits of the year.

Table 8: Results of empirical analysis using OECD panel data: Sensitivity analysis

| | Dependent variable: | | | | | |
|-------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|
| | logit_recipients_ratio | | | | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| mgincome | 18.939** (9.435) | 19.186** (9.375) | 16.213** (7.005) | 18.320** (7.447) | 16.694** (7.068) | 17.301** (7.034) |
| mgincome_2 | -23.707** (11.871) | -24.034** (11.807) | -20.404** (8.935) | -22.777** (9.430) | -20.186** (9.048) | -20.831** (8.722) |
| log_gdp_capita | | 0.084 (0.272) | 0.067 (0.275) | 0.033 (0.300) | 0.367* (0.214) | 0.518* (0.278) |
| unemployment | | | 2.942*** (0.733) | 2.879*** (0.768) | 4.113*** (0.740) | 4.730*** (1.086) |
| youth_dependency | | | | -3.903 (3.077) | -5.660 (3.985) | -5.629 (3.953) |
| old_dependency | | | | | -6.206 (4.810) | -6.518 (4.823) |
| divorce_rate | | | | | | 206.935 (187.571) |
| population_growth | | | | | | |
| Constant | -7.950*** (1.877) | -8.873** (3.586) | -8.333** (3.439) | -7.431* (3.869) | -8.931*** (3.016) | -11.083*** (3.277) |
| Observations | 150 | 150 | 150 | 150 | 150 | 150 |
| R^2 | 0.081 | 0.082 | 0.138 | 0.153 | 0.184 | 0.196 |
| Adjusted R^2 | 0.069 | 0.064 | 0.114 | 0.124 | 0.150 | 0.156 |

Notes: Numbers in parentheses stand for standard error calculated by HAC (Arellano, 1987) estimator. Above *, **, *** indicates statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively.